Board of Education of Logan City School District v. Jack Croft and Lucille Croft : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1962
Board of Education of Logan City School District v.
Jack Croft and Lucille Croft : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Olson & Calderwood; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Geo. D. Preston & Geo. W. Preston; Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Board of Education v. Croft, No. 9629 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4019
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
LOGAN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
JACK CROFT and LUCILLE 
CROFT, 
Defendants-Respondents 
; ~·,U'.J 'f 
' \ 
APPELLANT'S LBRIEF 
. Case No. 
9629 
. , /Ju ... ---~-
Appeal from the J udgiiient ·of ~tfie: ·t5~~iff\" flTAJ-i 
1st District Court for Cache 
County JlJN l t96zi-· .. / 
_jr· .. .. , 
Hon. Lewis Jones, Judge &..A'~v LJ 6AAR't 
Olson & Calderwood 
Thatcher Building 
Logan, Utah · . 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Geo. D. Preston & 
Geo. W. Preston 
Cache Valley Bank Building , 
Logan, Utah · 
.Attorneys for D~fendants-Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Nature of the Case ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
Disposition in Lower Court -------------------------------------------- 1 
Relief Sought on Appeal ------------------------------------------------ 2 
Statement of Facts ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
Argument ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
Statement of Points 
Point 1. The Court erred in submitting ques-
tion 3 to the jury. ------------------------------------ 4 
Point 2. The Court below erred in admitting 
evidence over appellant's objection, of 
the value and proposed use of respon-
dents' property in conjunction with 
other landowners and their property, 
for a subdivision. ------------------------------------ 13 
Conclusion ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
AUTHORITIES AND STATUTES CITED 
Am. Jur. Vol. 18, Eminent Domain Sec 140 ---------------- 9 
.Am. Jur. ·vol. 18, Eminent Domain Sec 347 ---------------- 16 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
53-4-8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
78-34-10 ( 3) ----------------·----------------------------------------------- 9 
U. R. C. P. 8 (c) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Nicholes, Eminent Domain, Vol. 4, 4th Ed. Sec. 
12.3142 ( 1) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Page 
Bingham v :Board of Education of Ogden City, 118 
u 582, 223 p 2d 432 ---------------------------------------------------- 8 
Campbell v United States, 266 US 368, 69 L. Ed 
328, 45 S. Ct 115 -------------------------------------------------------- 5 
Fairclaugh v Salt Lake County, 10 U 2d 417, 354 
p 2d 105 ;-------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Keller v Miller, 63 Colo. 304, 165 P 774 ------------------------ 5 
Lund v Salt Lake County, 58 U 546, 200 P 510 ________ 5 
Olson v. United States, 292 US 246, 54 S Ct 704, 
78 L Ed 1236 ----------~------------------------------------------------- 15 
Public Service Commission of Colo. v. City of Love-
land 79 Colo. 216, 245 P 493 ------------------------------------ 5 
Richert v. Board of Education of City of Newton, 
177 Kan. 502, 280 P 2d 596 ------------------------------------ 12 
Schuler v. Wilson 322 TIL 503, 153 NE 737 ----------~--------- 13 
Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 119 U 50, 224 P 2d 1037 -- 7 
Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 U 2d 100, 
349 p 2d 157 ------------------------------------------------------------ 6, 8 
State Highway Commission v. Triangle Development 
Co. ________ Wyo ________ , 369 P 2d 864 ---------------------------- 15 
State of Utah through its Road Commission v. 
Parker ________ u 2d ________ , 368 P 2d 585 -------------------- 8 
State v District Court Fourth Judicial District, 
94 u 384, 78 p 2d 502 -------------------------------------------- 10 
Twenty Second Corporation of Church of Jesus 
Christ v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 U 238, 
103 p 243 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
Winchester v. Ring 312 Ill. 544, 144 NE 333 -------------------- 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
LOGAN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
JACK CROFT and LUCILLE 
CROFT, 
Defendants-Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9629 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff School Board to 
condemn 1.24 acres of defendants' back yard for use as 
part of a larger tract on which is to be constructed a 
junior high school. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was submitted to a jury upon a Special 
Yerdict consisting of three questions. The questions and 
the jury's verdict follows: 
1. What was the fair cash market value, as of April 
25, 1960, of the 1.24 acres of ground sought to be con-
demned~ ($8,750) 
2. How much in damages, if any, will accrue to the 
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portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and 
the construction of the improvement in the manner pro-
posed by plaintiff~ ( $204.00) 
3. If you determine that the defendants' remaining 
property will be damaged by the construction of the 
propoaed improvement, then set out the amount of such 
damages. _._-\nswer : $4,000.00. 
Total : 12,954. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a ruling of this court that as a matter 
of law, question 3 was improperly submitted to the jury, 
and an elimination, as a matter of law, of said item of 
$4,000.00 from the jury award; and a new trial on the 
issue raised by question 1, with certain evidences con-
cerning value and proposed use of the property by de-
fendant eliminated from consideration by the jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff ia constructing a new junior high school in 
the vicinity of defendants' home on a tract of land con-
sisting of approximately 26 acres. 
1.24 acres of defendants' back yard, consisting of a 
parcel 24 rods east and west by 8 rods north and south, 
for parking use is included in the overall area. A sketch 
of the said area follows : 
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The parcel marked A is the piece in question. The area 
marked B is the general location of the actual school 
building. The area marked Cis property purchased from 
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the Nicholes' by the school board prior to the trial of 
this case. No part of the building will be on the land 
acquired from defendants. The distance from the north 
line of the property retained by defendants and the 
south line of the actual school building is 120 feet. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING QUESTION 
3 TO THE JURY. 
Question number 3 of the Special Verdict was sub-
mitted by the Court apparently on the theory that in 
addition to the consequential damage sustained by re-
spondents by reason of the use of land taken for a 
parking area, respondents were entitled to further con-
sequential damage to the land not taken by reason of the 
use of adjoining land acquired from third parties for 
school purposes. 
'l'here are at least three reasons why the submissioh 
of this question to the jury was error : 
A. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE MUST BE THE 
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE ACQUISITION OF 
THE LAND TAKEN FROM RESPONDENTS. 
B. CLAIM FOR SUCH ALLEGED DAMAGES 
DOES ·NOT LIE AGAINST THE LOGAN CITY 
BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
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C. TO BE SUSTAINED, CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGE MUST BE THAT RECOGNIZED AT COM-
~fON LAW. 
With regard to A, it should first be noted that the-re 
can be no dispute under the facts of this case that had 
respondents' land not been taken, the construction of the 
school building in the same location would still take 
place. 
The U. S. Supreme Court had occasion in the case 
of Campbell v United States, 266 U. S. 369, 69 L. Ed 328, 
45 S. Ct 115, to consider the propriety of awarding dam-
ages to a condemnee resulting from the use to be made 
of lands acquired from others. In rejecting the claim, 
it was stated therein: 
''The damages resulting to the remainder 
from the t~king of a part were separable from 
those caused by the use to be made of the lands 
acquired from others. The proposed use of the 
lands taken from others did not constitute a 
taking of his property.'' 
In the case of Keller v Miller, 63 Colo. 304, 165 P 
774, and repeated in Public Service Commission of Colo-
rado v City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 P 493, it was 
said that damages to a remainder by what was done else-
where than on the part taken were not to be considered. 
In Lund v Salt Lake County, 58 U 546, 200 P 510, 
the Utah court stated: 
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"We are clearly of the opinion that the dam-
ages for which compensation is allowed unde,r 
Article 1, Sec. 22 of the State Constitution are 
such as are the direct consequences of the lawful 
exercise of the right of eminent domain . . . '' 
It is submitted that compensable damage recover-
able in an eminent domain proceeding is limited to that 
arising as a direct result of the expropriation. This dam-
age was awarded to the respondents under question two 
of the Special Verdict returned by the jury. The respon-
dents are no more entitled to damages by reason of the 
construction and use of property in which they had no 
interest than they would be if the appellant had not 
sought any of their land. 
B. CLAIM FOR SUCH ALLEGED DAMAGE 
DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE LOGAN CITY 
BOARD OF EDlTCATION. 
If the claim of damages could not, in point of law, 
be the subject of an original action against the appel-
lant herein, to allow recovery under the pleadings filed 
seeking the same relief would permit respondents, in the 
words of Justice Henroid in Springville Banking Co. v. 
Burton ,10 U 2d 100, 349 P 2d 157, to accomplish indir-
ectly what they could not do directly. 
Question 3 submitted to the Jury goes beyond the 
specific issues raised by the complaint. It permits an 
award of damages which does not arise out of the subject 
matter of the condemnation action. Although respondents 
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included in their answe·r, a claim for consequential dam-
ages, it is more in the nature of a counterclaim and 
should be treated as such. 
Rule 8 (c), U. R. C. P. states: 
''When a party has mistakenly des gina ted a de-
fense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a 
defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, 
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a 
proper designation.'' 
Section 53-4-8 U.C.A. 1953 states that a Board of 
Education can sue and be sued, but this is not a blanket 
authorization for suits to be brought. In the case of 
Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 119 U 50, 224 P2d 1037 this 
language of the statute was covered so far as counties 
were concerned. 
In refering to the general powers of counties it 
was recognized that a county has power to sue and be 
sued. The eourt stated however: 
"This, however, is but a a general grant con-
stituting the· county an entity to sue and be sued, 
where it may under other applicable statutes or 
principles, properly be sued or sue. It is not 
a blanket authorization for suits to be brought 
against the counties.'' 
Our court has recognized that school boards act 
in connection with public education as agents or instru-
mentalities of the state in the performance of a gov-
ernmental function. Consequently they partake of the 
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state's sovereignty, at least in certain areas of the law. 
Bingham v Board of Education of Ogden City, 118 U 
582, 223 P2d 432 cites and adopts the rule that: 
''Where such a board is acting in a govern-
mental capacity in t!J.e discharge of its lawful 
duties, and its acts are such as are within its 
powers· as defined by law, it should be immune 
from all forma of action against it, except such 
as are by law permitted.'' 
. The law in this jurisdiction has been firmly estab-
lished that the state, acting in its soverign capacity 
through agencies may not be sued without its consent. 
Springville Banking Co. v Burton, supra; Fairclaugh 
v. Salt Lake· County, 10 U _2d 417, 354 P 2d 105, State 
of Utah, by and through its Road Commission v Parker 
et al ________ U 2d ________ , 368 P 2d 585. 
In the Parker case, aupra, the state commence~ a 
condemnation suit, and upon appeal from a judgment 
granting the state's motion to dismiss the condemnee's 
counterclain1 for consequential damage not arising di-
rectly from the taking, it was held that the condemnee's 
counterclaim could not be maintained. The filing of a 
complaint by the soverign works no alchemy opening 
the door to claims not otherwise recognized. 
C. TO BE SUSTAINED, CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGE l\1UST BE THAT RECOGNIZED AT COl\f-
MON LAW. 
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Section 78-34-10 (3) covers damage though no land 
is taken in a condemnation auit. In order for this sec-
tion to be invoked in a proper suit, the damage suf-
fered n1ust be that which was recognized at the com-
mon law, and the party causing such damage must have 
been liable for such injury at the common law. 
American Jurisprudence in volume 18 at page 767, 
(sec 140), states the general rule: 
"It is generally agreed that the damage clause 
of the state constitutions haa no application to 
the depreciation of the market value of a parcel 
of land caused by the establishment of some 
public building or other public undertaking in 
close proximity thereto, when there is no physical 
injury to the property or impairment of any 
right appurtenant thereto, and the public use 
is not of such a character as would have consti-
tuted a nuisance at common law and given rise 
to an action by an adjoining owner in the ab-
sence of statutory protection." 
This court in Twenty Second Corporation of Church 
of Jesus Christ v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 U 238, 
103 P 243, was called upon to construe the provisions 
of our constitutional provision that "private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without 
just compensation.'' It was stated: 
"It seems to us however, that the clause in the 
Constitution that private property shall not be 
taken nor damaged clearly means that some phy-
sical injury or damage to the property itself shall 
be committeed, and does not include something 
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which merely affects the senses of the persons 
who use the property." 
In reversing the .. judgment for plaintiff the Court 
further stated : 
''If mere annoyances through noises which are 
necessarily incident to the conduct of a lawful 
business in its nature public can be made the 
subject of damage suits then we can see no point 
at which a line may be drawn when such actions 
may not be maintained. If mere annoyances 
from noises gives a right of action for damages, 
then everyone who is annoyed must be permit-
ted to sue for and recover damages to the extent 
to which he is affected." 
The case of State v. District Court Fourth Judicial 
District 94 U 384, 78 P2d, 502 settled where the line 
for· the recovery of damages should be drawn. The 
court stated: 
''We believe that the line of demarcation 
should be drawn at the point of actionable dam-
age. The constitution clearly does not require 
compensation for damages not recognized as 
actionable at common law, but for a damaging 
of property to the actionable degree the consti-
tution makers intended the land owner to have 
just compensation equally with the land owner 
whose property was physically taken.'' 
The Fourth District case impliedly indictes the type 
of damages which would be actionable. Mentioned were 
deprivation of convenient access to property, depriva-
tion of easements, light, air and view, raising of streets 
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and loss of continuous travel. 
An examination of the transcript of the instant 
case reflects no actionable damage. Without burdening 
this brief it can be indicated generally what testimony 
was adduced and considered by respondents and their 
witnes;ses as to the cause of alleged damage to their 
remaining property. 
Mr. C. Lester Pocock called by respondents stated 
that his reasons for estimating damage was that it 
was the inconvenience to the property own~r. Tr. 23. 
That it would not be in a strictly residential area. Tr, 
44. That there would be vandalism and the proximity 
of teenagers. Tr. 45. 
Mr. J. B. Gunnell, the only other witness who had 
any basis for damage indicated the sole factor he con-
sidered was that he, personally, as an F.H.A. appraiser, 
would not approve the home for F.H.A. financing 
should a prospective purchaser desire the same. Tr 77. 
He had no other reason. Tr. 80. 
There was no showing of elements of trespass or 
interference with any property rights. To permit re-
covery of damages for such illusuory and speculative in-
juries as this record shows would be to open the. door to 
claims from any person who is in any way affected by a 
public project. A condemnee ia given no greater rights to 
conpensation against the public than he has against his 
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private neighbors. Had a neighbor constructed a private 
s~hQol,; a super market, service station or any other struc-
tur.e, it may have affected the market value of respon-
dents' home, but it would not be the basis for an action 
for damages. 
In th~s regard we would like to refer the Court to the 
Kansas case of Richert vs. the Board of Education of the 
City of Newton, 177 Kan 502, 280 P 2nd 596. This was an 
action by a property oWner for damages caused by 
condemnation of. all the property in a city block by 
schooL board for school use ·except the plaintiff. Kansas 
has not adopted any provision whereby the condemnor 
rnust pay for property taken or damaged as has Utah 
and Illinois, but the Kansas sourt applied the same law 
as . IlJinois in the case of • Winchester cv~ .. Ring, 312 illi-
nois 544, NE 333.c The last cited case stated: 
= .L_. ~ j ·- . ' 
''The right to damages, (where a cemetery was 
located -?djacent to the dwelling house of ap.,. 
. pellant) _ must be based on the ground that a 
right· of property has been disturbed, and cannot 
be awarded for an -injury to the convenience or 
feelings of the owner. *** It is one which affects 
the feelings of the individual owner~ only, and 
varies with the sentiments of each particular 
individual. It is, furthermore, not different from 
that sustained by others residing in that neigh-
borhood, tho it may be of a greater degree '' 
312 Ill. at page 553, 144 N.E. at page 336. 
The general rule, which applies in the case under 
consideration, is stated as, follows in the above opinion: 
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''There are certain InJuries which are neces-
sarily incident to the ownership of property in 
towns or cities which directly impair the value 
of private property, for which the law does not, 
and ne,ver has, afforded. any relief ***." 312 Ill. 
at page 550, 144 N.E. at page 335. 
and the court in the same opinion later says : 
"*** such supposed damages must be consid-: 
ered as dmnnum absque injuria, on the theory 
of the law that the plaintiff is compensated for 
the injury sustained by sharing the general 
benefits which are secured to all by it *** ". 312 
Ill. at page 552. 144 N. E. at page 336. · 
In the case of Schuler v. Wilson, 322 Ill. 503, 153 
N.E. 737,48 A.L.R. 1027,1030, none of Luella B. Wilsdri's 
land was taken, but she owned land occupied by herself 
and her husband as a re~sidence immediately adjoining 
land used for school purposes. That court held there 
was no physical interference with her property· and rto 
direct physical disturbance of any right which she en-
joyed in connection with her property and there were, 
therefore, no damages. Use of adjacent property as·· a 
school playground causing depreciation of the value 
of neighboring property is no justification for damages 
or assessment of damages in eminent domain proceed-
ings. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ADMIT.TING 
EVIDENCE, OVER APPELLANT'S OBJECTION, 
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OF THE VALUE AND PROPOSED USE OF RE-
SPONDENTS' PROPERTY IN C 0 N J UN C T I 0 N 
WITH OTHER LANDOWNERS AND THEIR PRO-
PERTY, FOR A SUBDIVISION. 
All of the evidence adduced by respondents on the 
market value of the 1.24 acre tract taken was based upon 
the assumption of a fundamental premise which was non-
:-- . 
existant. 
Over the objection of appellant, Tr. 16, 123, re-
spondents were permitted to introduce in evidence Ex-
hibit D2, :an overlay which indicated a scheme of de-
velopment of a group of building lots. The . use of the 
land as a subdivision required. the utilization of two 
other peices of land owned by others. There was no 
written · contract between respondents. and the other 
landowners, T.r: 16. There was no testimony as to who 
actually .'·owned 'or had interests in the other lands, 
although. the land was identified as ''Nicholes'' proper-
ty and "Tingy" property. 
Witness Gunnell testified as to value of the land 
solely on the assumption that access to respondents 
property would be available through other property~ 
Tr. 83. 
Respondent Croft gave no thought to, and had no 
idea of the valu·e of his land e~cept through the use of 
land owned by others. ~~- I .t. c' / I~/,. 
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In Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 S Ct 704, 
78 L. Ed. 1236 it was stated: 
Elements affecting value that depend upon 
events or combinations of occurrences which, 
while within the realm of possibility, are not 
fairly shown to be reasonably probable should be 
excluded from consideration for that would be 
to allow mere speculation and conjecture to be-
come a guide for the ascertainment of value -
a thing to be condemned in business transactions 
as well as in judicial ascertainment of truth. 
The Wyoming case of State Highway Commission v. 
Triangle Development Co., ________ Wyo. ________ , 369 P 2d 
864 indicates that the following from 4 Nichols, Eminent 
Domain at Sec. 12.3142 (1), pp. 176-182 4th Ed. is worthy 
of confidence : 
''It is well settled that if land is so situated that 
it is actually available for building purposes, its 
value for such purposes may be considered . . . 
The 1neasure of compensation is not, however, 
the aggregate of the prices of the lots into which 
the tract could be best divided, since the expense 
of cleaning off and improving the land, laying 
out streets, dividing it into lots, advertising and 
selling the same, and holding it and paying taxes 
and interest until all the lots are disposed of 
cannot be ignored and is too uncertain and con-
jectural to be computed ... " 
''The possibility for building purposes must 
not be entirely remote and speculative, thereby 
rendering evidence of such use inadmissable; ... 
the mere filing of a subdivision map has been 
held not to establish the potentiality of the prop-
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erty for building purposes.'' 
The proposed plan admitted is evidence in nothing 
more than a visionary hope of respondents. 
American Jurisprudence Volume 18, Eminent Do-
main at page 991, section 347 states clearly the rule in 
this regard : 
''Proof must be limited to showing the present 
condition of the property and the uses to which it 
is naturally adapted. It is not competent for the 
owner to show to what use he intended to put 
the propHrty, not what plans he had for its im-
provements, nor the probable future use of the 
property, nor the profits which would arise if 
the property were devoted to a particular use.'' 
The violation of the above rule is shown by the 
testimony of respondent Croft when he testified, Tr. 109: 
"It's no longer land that I would sell by the 
acre, and keep in mind that I'm the man that 
would develop this land, No one else. I would 
sell this land lot by lot.'' 
All of the evidence of respondents regarding the 
best use of the land and the value by reason of that use 
is based upon a promotional scheme entirely in the 
future. To allow damages to be fixed upon such a basis 
would be as foreign to the law as would an allowance of 
damages because the school board in fact purchased 
the land of a third person, thereby preventing his plan 
of developing the entire area. 
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CONCLUSION 
The jury award of $4,000.00 should be eliminated, 
and a new trial be granted on the issue of the value of 
the land taken by appellant. 
Respectfully Submitted 
OLSON & CALDERWOOD 
By Curtis E. Calderwood 
Attorneys for plaintiff-appellant 
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